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A SOLUTION TO THE MURKINESS OF
NONPARENT VISITATION RIGHTS
IN TEXAS
Morgan Tauscher*

ABSTRACT
To protect parental rights, Texas law presumes that a child’s parent or
parents are in the position to make decisions regarding the best interest of
their child. However, Texas courts favor granting nonparent visitation
rights, even over parents’ objections, if there is sufficient evidence presented
by the nonparent to overcome the presumption. Although Texas law is
well-established when considering sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in nonparent child custody cases, courts are inconsistent about
the standards and tests involved in nonparent child visitation cases. There
are differences between child custody disputes and visitation disputes, such
as the level of parental intrusion and the duties required of the nonparent.
Thus, Texas courts should consider certain factors when evaluating a
nonparent’s evidence for court-ordered visitation, which differs from the
evidence necessary in child custody disputes.
This Comment seeks to explore the gaps in Texas law regarding
nonparent visitation and resolve, through a factor test, what qualifies as
sufficient evidence to overcome the parental presumption in visitation
cases. It does so by proposing the same standard of evidence in visitation
and child custody disputes to safeguard the fundamental right of parental
autonomy. Further, this Comment analyzes the specific factors Texas
should consider in creating a factor test that other state legislatures and
supreme courts deem relevant in visitation disputes. Implementing a factor
test increases the predictability of visitation outcomes, allowing litigants to
understand the evidence courts will consider, while still providing flexibility
for the courts to analyze each situation involving a nonparent and child on
a case-by-case basis.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has long recognized that the regulation of certain
areas of relationships, including family matters, rests almost exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the states. Texas lawmakers created a
nonparental child custody framework that gives deference to the decisions of the child’s fit parent or parents; however, the law determining
whether a nonparent has presented sufficient evidence for visitation time
remains unresolved. Although many states address this issue through
their legislatures and court systems, no singular framework is acknowledged as most accurately capturing the best interest of the child.
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This Comment argues that the “significant impairment” test used by
Texas courts to determine whether a nonparent is granted custody of another’s child should also apply in nonparent visitation cases. Even though
visitation suits invade less into parental rights than do custody suits, the
same standard of evidence should be required to overcome the parental
presumption in Texas. Further, to determine whether a nonparent’s evidence overcomes the presumption that the parent acts in the best interest
of the child in visitation disputes, the Texas legislature or Texas courts can
establish a factor test to provide guidance to lower courts and avoid inconsistencies in rulings. In addition to the Holley best-interest factors,
specific factors to consider are: (1) the length and quality of the prior
relationship between the child and nonparent seeking visitation rights; (2)
the specific requests by the nonparent for visitation, such as the quantity
of time requested and the distance between the nonparent and child’s
homes; as well as (3) the effect that the nonparent’s visitation has in furthering other important relationships in the child’s life, such as the child’s
bonds with siblings and other relatives.
This Comment will explore the present state of nonparent visitation
rights when a parent or parents are deemed “fit.” First, Part I discusses
the history of the parental presumption and the best-interest standard,
both of which are critical components in all child custody and visitation
cases in Texas. This Comment will address the parental presumption as
described within the Texas Family Code, general interpretations by Texas
courts for expansion of the presumption, and how the best-interest factors are relevant in child disputes. Part II explains the Texas law regarding nonparent standing and the recent Texas court decisions expanding
the parental presumption to specific nonparent dispute situations. Finally,
Part III analyzes the evidence required to overcome the presumption that
fit parents’ decisions are in the best interest of a child when a nonparent,
who acts as a parent, seeks visitation. To evaluate the degree of evidence
necessary, this Comment will look at specific factors other state legislatures and supreme courts deem relevant in visitation disputes that Texas
would benefit from considering.
II. THE HISTORY OF TEXAS CHILD CUSTODY AND
VISITATION DISPUTES
A. PARENTAL PRESUMPTION
Historically, Texas law presumed that the best-interest-of-the-child
standard is served by awarding custody to at least one of the child’s biological parents.1 The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the constitutionally-protected right of parents to raise their children in 1923 in Meyer
v. Nebraska,2 and more recently stated that this right is “perhaps the old1. Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tex. 1990).
2. See 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
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est of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”3 Under
common law, a parent or parents could allow nonparent visitation with
their child; however, many courts declined to award visitation rights
against the parents’ wishes because nonparent and parent conflict was
contrary to the well-being of the child.4 More recently, Texas courts have
favored granting nonparent visitation rights—even over parents’ objections—if the nonparent presents sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that the child’s parent or parents are able to make decisions in
the best interest of their child.5
1. The Creation of Standing for Nonparents in Child Disputes
The Texas Legislature established standing for a nonparent in a parentlike role in a provision the Texas Family Code,6 the constitutionality of
which was later upheld by the Texas Supreme Court.7 This provision allows nonparents to bring original or modification suits regarding child
custody and visitation matters.8 In interpreting the Texas Family Code
statute, the Texas Supreme Court held that standing for a nonparent in a
parent-like role is established if, for the requisite six-month period, “the
nonparent served in a parent-like role by (1) sharing a principal residence
with the child, (2) providing for the child’s daily physical and psychological needs, and (3) exercising guidance, governance, and direction similar
to that typically exercised on a day-to-day basis by parents with their children.”9 The court further explained that the “relationship that develops
over time between a child and a person who serves in a parent-like
role . . . justifies allowing that person to seek to preserve involvement in
the child’s life.”10
2. Parental Presumption in Original Custody and Visitation Suits
In Troxel v. Granville, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that the
Constitution, specifically the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, protects “the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”11 To
protect that right, a plurality in Troxel applied “a presumption that fit
parents act in the best interests of their children,”12 and thus, the pre3. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion).
4. Lorri Ann Romesberg, Note, Common Law Adoption: An Argument for Statutory
Recognition of Non-Parent Caregiver Visitation, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 163, 166–67 (1999)
(first citing Veazey v. Stewart, 472 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Ark. 1971); then citing Odell v. Lutz,
177 P.2d 628, 629 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947); and then citing In re Marriage of Freel, 448
N.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Iowa 1989)).
5. See, e.g., In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 163 (Tex. 2018).
6. Id. at 155–56, 160 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 102.003(a)).
7. Id. at 161–63.
8. FAM. §§ 102.003(a)(9), 156.002(b).
9. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 160; accord FAM. § 102.003(a)(9).
10. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 159.
11. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (plurality opinion).
12. Id. at 68.
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sumption is served “by awarding” the child to the parent.13 Additionally,
the Court held that:
[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e.,
[the parent] is [deemed] fit), there will normally be no reason for the
State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further
question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.14
The Court explained that “the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”15
A statutory provision in the Texas Family Code creates a presumption
that the parents should be managing conservators or that one parent
should be a sole managing conservator of the child.16 Managing conservatorships give the conservator the right to make decisions regarding
the child, including residential and educational decisions.17 However, no
presumption exists that one fit parent is favored over another fit parent.18
The test to determine the evidence required to overcome the presumption is similar for both the nonparent standing statute in original managing conservatorship disputes,19 as well as the narrower grandparent
standing statute in possessory conservatorship disputes.20 Possessory conservatorship gives the person court-ordered possession of or access to the
child, often referred to as visitation.21 In Chapter 153 of the Texas Family
Code, governing original child disputes, a nonparent seeking managing
conservatorship of the child must demonstrate that the appointment of
the child’s parents or parent would not be in the best interest of the child,
because the appointment “would significantly impair the child’s physical
health or emotional development.”22 Likewise, a court may award a
grandparent possession of or access to a child over a parent’s objection
only if the grandparent overcomes the presumption that a parent acts in
the child’s best interest by proving that the denial of possession of or
access to the child would significantly impair the child’s physical health or
emotional well-being.23 Even if the nonparent is unable to overcome the
parental presumption to establish managing conservatorship, the court
may still name the nonparent as a possessory conservator, entitling the
13. In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804, 812 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Taylor v. Meek, 276 S.W.2d
787, 790 (Tex. 1955)).
14. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69.
15. Id. at 65–66.
16. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(a).
17. Id. § 153.132(1), (7); see also id. § 101.016 (defining “joint managing
conservatorship”).
18. See id. § 153.131.
19. Id. § 102.003(a)(9).
20. Id. § 153.433(a)(2).
21. See id. §§ 152.102(16), 153.006.
22. Id. § 153.131(a); M.A.R.G. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-2000413-CV, 2020 WL 7294610, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 11, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
23. FAM. § 153.433(a)(2).
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nonparent to court-ordered visitation with the child.24
The plain language of Texas Family Code under section 153.131(a)
“does not necessarily require proof of a parent’s blameworthy conduct as
a prerequisite to appointment of a nonparent as managing conservator.”25 The evidence must “support the logical inference that [the parent’s] specific identifiable behavior or conduct . . . will probably cause
that harm” based on recent or past conduct.26 Further, the evidence must
do more than “merely raise a suspicion or speculation of possible harm”
to the child.27 Presenting evidence that a nonparent would be a better
custodian than a biological parent is insufficient to overcome the parental
presumption in child disputes.28 In addition, evidence that a parent may
harm the child in a slight manner also does not satisfy the requirements
for overcoming the parental presumption.29 Thus, “the non-parent must
offer evidence of specific acts or omissions of the parent that demonstrate
[that] award[ing] . . . custody to the parent would result in physical or
emotional harm to the child” to overcome the presumption.30 Although
the most common way nonparents overcome the parental presumption is
by proving the unfitness of the parent, courts give other examples of ways
nonparents can overcome this presumption, such as if the parent abandons or deserts the child or displays behavior “so immoral as to be detrimental to the child.”31
3. Parental Presumption in Modification Custody and Visitation Suits
Although the Texas legislature has seen fit to include an express parental presumption in Chapter 153 of the Texas Family Code to govern original proceedings, there is no express parental presumption in Chapter 156,
which governs modification suits.32 The Texas Supreme Court concluded
in In re V.L.K. that because the state legislature did not express its intent
to apply the presumption in Chapter 156 modification suits, the presumption does not apply.33 The court noted that original and modification proceedings are governed by separate statutory schemes and involve
different issues, so varying standards and burdens of proof should ap24. Shook v. Gray, 381 S.W.3d 540, 543 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam).
25. In re R.T.K., 324 S.W.3d 896, 902 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet.
denied); see also In re G.R.W., 191 S.W.3d 896, 900 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.)
(“[E]ven without evidence establishing any blameworthiness of the parent, the parental
presumption can be rebutted by other evidence establishing the statutorily required negative effect of the child.”).
26. Taylor v. Taylor, 254 S.W.3d 527, 536 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no
pet.).
27. In re B.B.M., 291 S.W.3d 463, 467 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
28. Taylor, 254 S.W.3d at 536 (citing Whitworth v. Whitworth, 222 S.W.3d 616, 623
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.)).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Neely v. Welch, 2014-CA-01022-COA (¶ 20), 194 So. 3d 149, 156 (Miss. Ct. App.
2015).
32. In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338, 341–42 (Tex. 2000) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§§ 156.101(a)).
33. Id. at 343.
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ply.34 Without an express provision, the court found that the legislature
did not intend to extend the presumption; thus, parents no longer enjoyed
the benefit of the parental presumption applying in modification disputes.35 Further, the court justified limiting the presumption to original
suits because extending the presumption would raise policy concerns.36
Specifically, extending the presumption might cause instability and hinder
efficiency with increased, constant litigation in the court system.37
However, in 2020, the Texas Supreme Court found that the parental
presumption applies in any proceeding where, over the child’s fit parent’s
objection, a nonparent seeks conservatorship or access to the child.38 The
court determined that the trial court’s relegation of the fit parent’s desire
from presumption to mere factor in determining the best interest of the
child was “exactly the opposite of the parental presumption” established
in Troxel.39 Moreover, the trial court placed the burden on the fit parent
to disprove that visitation would be in the best interests of the child,
which was incorrect according to the Texas Supreme Court.40 Although
the high court found that the presumption exists in any proceeding, the
nonparent did not alternatively argue that his evidence overcame the presumption.41 Thus, the court had no basis to evaluate the question.42 Acknowledging that the parental “presumption is a pivotal part of the bestinterest analysis” when determining child custody and visitation “even in
the absence of a specific statutory standard,” the concurring opinion
stated that the presumption “is not absolute.”43 By providing three principles to guide courts in determining the constitutionality of a third-party
visitation statute, the Troxel Court declined to hold that third-party visitation statutes are per se unconstitutional.44 This, therefore, suggests that
there can be instances when it is constitutional for the fit parent’s right of
care, custody, and control of the parent’s child to be intruded upon and
for visitation to be ordered against the parent’s wishes.45
B. BEST INTEREST STANDARD OVERVIEW
Texas law establishes that when a court determines conservatorship or
possession, its primary consideration must always be the best interest of
34. Id.
35. Id. at 342–43.
36. Id. at 343.
37. Id.; see also FAM. §§ 153.134(b)(5), 156.101.
38. In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804, 817 (Tex. 2020).
39. Id. at 814–16 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69 (2000)).
40. Id. at 816.
41. Id. at 821 (Lehrmann, J., concurring).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 823.
44. SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 820–21 (Minn. 2007) (citing Troxel, 530 U.S.
at 69–70, 73).
45. See id.
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the child.46 Further, courts recognize that the parent–child relationship
deserves primacy and will only award visitation or custody to a nonparent
upon proof that the award would serve the best interests of the child.47
When determining the child’s best interest, courts have wide discretion.48
Although Texas courts give deference to the best-interest factors, this
alone does not determine the outcome in a suit for conservatorship of the
child or access to the child.49 Under a two-part test, courts take into consideration the best-interest factors and the parental presumption to make
decisions regarding child custody and visitation.50
In Holley v. Adams, the Texas Supreme Court established best-interest
factors for courts consider in child conservatorship cases.51 The factors
include:
(A) the desires of the child; (B) the emotional and physical needs of
the child now and in the future; (C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (D) the parental abilities of
the individuals seeking custody; (E) the programs available to assist
these individuals . . . ; (F) the plans for the child by these individuals . . . ; (G) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (H) the
acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing
parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (I) any excuse for
the acts or omissions of the parent.52
Proof of the best interest of the child is not limited to these factors set
out in Holley, nor do all factors always apply in every case.53 For example, courts may consider additional factors depending on the facts of a
case to determine a child’s best interest, including parental drug abuse,54
a parent’s long-term employment and financial stability, and a parent’s
failure to visit the child.55 The best-interest factors apply when a visitation or child custody dispute is between parents or between a parent and
nonparent, as the Texas Family Code expressly states that a court’s primary consideration in all conservatorship cases is always the best interest
of the child.56 Thus, the Holley factors are considered in every conservatorship case—managing or possessory.57 Moreover, the court must give
46. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002 (“The best interest of the child shall always be
the primary consideration of the court in determining the issues of conservatorship and
possession of and access to the child.”).
47. See In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 161–62 (Tex. 2018).
48. In re Ryan, No. 12-16-00284-CV, 2016 WL 6996639, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov.
30, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex.
1982)).
49. See In re Marriage of Mitchell, 585 S.W.3d 38, 47–51 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019,
no pet.).
50. See id.
51. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).
52. Id. at 372 (footnotes omitted).
53. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002).
54. In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 820 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.); In re Walters, 39 S.W.3d 280, 288–89 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, no pet.).
55. In re Vogel, 261 S.W.3d 917, 925 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
56. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002.
57. See id.
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weight to more than one relevant factor in the best-interest inquiry, as
“no single [Holley consideration] is controlling.”58
However, given the expansion of the parental presumption,59 what a
court determines to be completely and thoroughly best for the child does
not always match the outcome based on the best-interest-of-the-child
standard.60 For example, experts disagree as to whether court-mandated
visitation, after a nonparent overcomes the parental presumption, actually serves the child’s best interest.61 It is argued by experts that in situations where the “legal parents’ decisions are inarguably damaging to their
child’s psyche and emotional well-being, the decision may nevertheless be
labeled the child’s ‘best interest’” because the best-interest standard now
considers the child’s parents’ interests as well.62 Thus, the best-interest
standard may be understood as serving the best interests of the parents
but not necessarily their children.63 Nonetheless, the Texas legislature
and Texas courts still reason that this analysis determines the best interest
of the child because considering a parent’s well-being and stability has the
child’s best interest in mind when determining conservatorship cases.64
In conclusion, Texas case law and the Texas Family Code highlight a
long-standing recognition that the child’s best interest is the courts’ main
consideration and have expanded the parental presumption to apply in
both original and modification suits. This balance between the best interest of the child and the parental presumption may emphasize the parents’
best interests, which disregards the traditional precedent placing the importance on the child’s best interest.65 Nevertheless, both considerations
are imperative in resolving child disputes in Texas.

58. A.S. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 394 S.W.3d 703, 714 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2012, no pet.) (“Undisputed evidence of a single factor may be sufficient to support a
finding that termination is in the best interest a child.”).
59. Taylor v. Taylor, 254 S.W.3d 527, 536 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no
pet.).
60. Lauren Valastro, Comment, Training Wheels Needed: Balancing the Parental Presumption, the Best Interest Standard, and the Need to Protect Children, 44 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 503, 510–11 (2012).
61. Compare Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33, 39 (Ky. 1979) (Stephenson, J., dissenting) (noting that visitation with nonparent should only occur with consent of the parent), and JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 37–38 (1973) (opposing mandated visitation by the court because
it may result in the child feeling insecure about the custodial parent’s role), with Maxwell v.
LeBlanc, 434 So. 2d 375, 379 (La. 1983) (finding that a denial of visitation to a nonparent
can lead to feelings of rejection and confusion by the child).
62. See, e.g., Nicole M. Onorato, Comment, The Right to Be Heard: Incorporating the
Needs and Interests of Children of Nonmarital Families into the Visitation Rights Dialogue,
4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 491, 505 (2005).
63. Id.
64. In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804, 812–13, 818–19 (Tex. 2020).
65. Valastro, supra note 60, at 510–11.
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III. THE TEXAS STANDARD: OVERCOMING THE PARENTAL
PRESUMPTION IN CHILD DISPUTES
The U.S. Supreme Court in Troxel concluded that a court “‘must accord at least some special weight’ to a fit parent’s best-interest determination,” but declined to define the scope of the parental rights in visitation
or “consider whether a ‘showing of harm or potential harm to the child
[is] a condition precedent to granting visitation.’”66 By refusing to establish a uniform standard in nonparental visitation cases, the Court implies
that each state can adopt its own standard as long as the standard recognizes the constitutional right to give some “weight to the parent’s own
determination.”67 This ruling defers to the states to evaluate child disputes on a case-by-case basis.68 Thus, it remains unclear post-Troxel when
a court may award visitation “to a nonparent over a fit parent’s objection,
notwithstanding the special weight that [is] accorded [to] the parent’s decision” under the parental presumption.69
A. BRIEF OVERVIEW

OF

CURRENT NONPARENT CHILD DISPUTES
TEXAS

IN

While “[p]arental rights are fundamental, . . . neither the Texas Family
Code nor the [Texas] Constitution treats [these rights] as plenary or unchecked.”70 Instead, under Texas Family Code section 102.003(a)(9),
Texas recognizes nonparents’ parent-like actions to try to preserve their
relationship with the child.71 According to the Texas Family Code, the
court determines whether to appoint a nonparent or parent as possessory
conservator by considering whether it is in the child’s best interest under
section 102.003(a)(9)’s standing requirements.72 Some critics, including a
dissenting Texas Supreme Court justice, argue that the upshot of this provision is that nearly anyone who has “played an unusual and significant
parent-like role in a child’s life” may sue for visitation despite the parents’ objections.73 In addition, some experts agree that the court should
avoid burdening a parent’s “right to raise their children as they see fit” as
a matter of public policy.74 However, a majority of the Texas Supreme
Court addressed this statute in In re H.S. and held that the statute is limited to nonparents “who have exercised ‘actual care, control, and possession’ of a child for at least six months.”75 Thus, the nonparent standing
threshold in Texas is constitutional, as it is “much higher and narrower
66. In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 821 (Lehrmann, J., concurring) (alteration in original)
(quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70, 73 (2000)).
67. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70, 73.
68. Id. at 73.
69. In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 821.
70. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 163 (Tex. 2018).
71. Id.
72. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002.
73. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 166 (Blacklock, J., dissenting).
74. See, e.g., id.
75. Id. at 161–62 (majority opinion).
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than the one rejected in Troxel.”76 To additionally support its rationale in
In re H.S., the Texas Supreme Court determined that the Court in Troxel
did not hold that no nonparents could have standing in a custody dispute,
but rather that standing to any nonparent is not narrowly tailored enough
to withstand review.77
A Texas court of appeals in In re C.J.C. later commented on the Texas
Supreme Court’s analysis, reinforcing the high court’s decision in the
case.78 Although the Texas statutes place no express burden on the
nonparent to overcome the presumption for possessory conservator
cases, the In re C.J.C. court found it must be read into “any best-interest
determination,” including when a “court weighs a fit parent’s rights
against a claim of conservatorship or access by a nonparent.”79 A Texas
appellate court noted that when a nonparent requests conservatorship or
possession of a child, “the child’s best interest is embedded with the presumption that it is the fit parent—not a court—who makes the determination whether to allow that request.”80 To put it another way, “to have
properly exercised its discretion in ordering visitation over [the parent’s]
objection, there must have been sufficient evidence presented to the trial
court to overcome the presumption that [the parent] acts in his [or her]
children’s best interest.”81 “[E]ven when a nonparent with standing . . .
seeks possessory conservatorship or access rather than . . . managing conservatorship, the best-interest determination necessarily encompasses the
constitutionally required deference to a fit parent’s decisions.”82
The Texas Family Code fails to state the evidence necessary to overcome the presumption in a modification suit, like the one at issue in In re
C.J.C., regarding a nonparent who acts in a parent-like role.83 The Code
also fails to address awards of possession or access to a nonparent acting
in a parent-like role.84 Instead, the Code only offers guidance in certain
situations, such as in original suits affecting a parent-child relationship
and grandparent visitation rights, both of which use a test of whether the
change would “significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development.”85 For original suits affecting the parent–child relationship, the parents are appointed managing conservators or a parent is
appointed sole managing conservator “unless the court finds that appointment of the parent or parents would not be in the best interest of
the child because the appointment would significantly impair the child’s
76. Id. at 162.
77. Id. at 161.
78. In re S.K., No. 13-19-00213-CV, 2020 WL 4812633, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg Aug. 13, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
79. Id. (quoting In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804, 818–19 (Tex. 2020) (emphasis added)).
80. Id. (quoting In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 820).
81. Id. (citing In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 820).
82. In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 822 (Lehrmann, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 821–22.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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physical health or emotional development.”86 Likewise, a court may
award a grandparent possession of or access to a child over a parent’s
objection only if, among other things, the grandparent “overcomes the
presumption that a parent acts in the best interest of the parent’s child by
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that denial of possession of
or access to the child would significantly impair the child’s physical health
or emotional well-being.”87
B. UNANSWERED: WHAT EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME
THE PARENTAL PRESUMPTION IN VISITATION DISPUTES
While Texas law is relatively well-developed regarding child custody
disputes and the best-interest factors to take into consideration for those
situations, Texas law is not as detailed in situations where a nonparent
requests visitation over a parent’s objection, and it would do well by establishing a standard of evidence necessary to overcome the parental
presumption.
Although the Texas Supreme Court has recognized that a court can
award possessory conservatorship or access to a nonparent if in the
child’s best interest, Texas has not “evaluated the propriety of such an
award in light of the fit-parent presumption.”88 The Texas Supreme Court
has not received the opportunity “to review the merits of an award of
possession or access to a nonparent whose standing is premised on the
parent-like role” since the decision of Troxel.89 On the other hand, state
supreme courts have expressed that Troxel merely shows a situation
when parental decisions are questioned—when a parent is unfit—but that
this is not “the only . . . instance” on which the presumption can be overcome.90 For example, it is not essential to show abandonment or parental
unfitness to overcome a biological parent’s right.91 Instead, these courts
award custody or visitation if the best interest of the child requires the
custody or visitation.92
The question of the degree of evidence necessary to overcome the presumption that a fit parent’s decisions are in the best interest of the child
when a nonparent who acted in a parent-like role seeks visitation remains
unanswered.93 By leaving this question open, lower level courts will continue to display inconsistencies in rationales and analyses to evaluate certain situations involving custody and visitation rights. Thus, Texas needs
to employ a factor test, following guidance from other state legislatures
and courts, to evaluate whether the nonparent has evidence to overcome
86. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(a).
87. Id. § 153.433(a)(2).
88. In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 823 (Lehrmann, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 822.
90. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Hernandez, 265 P.3d 495, 500 (Idaho 2011) (emphasis
added).
91. See, e.g., id.
92. See, e.g., id.
93. In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 823 (Lehrmann, J., concurring).
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the parental presumption to ensure a just result for the benefit of the
child in visitation suits.
IV. HOW A NONPARENT CAN OVERCOME THE PARENTAL
PRESUMPTION IN VISITATION
The degree of evidence necessary to overcome the presumption that a
fit parent’s decisions are in the best interest of the child when a
nonparent who acted in a parent-like role seeks visitation is a difficult
and fact-specific issue that remains unanswered in Texas law. First, the
proper test to determine whether evidence overcomes the presumption in
a visitation dispute should be the same test used to address whether a
nonparent overcomes the same parental presumption in the custody context—the “significant impairment” test.94 Further, given that the question
of evidence sufficient to overcome the parental presumption will significantly vary depending on the facts in a case, the best solution is to employ
a factor test. A factor test allows the court to emphasize the factors relevant to the visitation case at hand. Adopting this approach will improve
flexibility, clarity, and predictability for all litigants and lower courts.
A. RECONCILING CUSTODY

AND

VISITATION STANDARDS

IN

TEXAS

1. Why Preponderance of Evidence Is the Proper Burden of Proof in
Child Modification Disputes
The burden of proof for nonparent modification child custody and visitation suits is unclear in Texas.95 In original suits, the nonparent must
overcome the presumption that a parent acts in the best interest of the
parent’s child by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that appointment of the parent as a managing conservator would significantly
impair the child, either physically or emotionally.96 The Texas Family
Code also specifies that if the case involves parental termination in addition to the modification by a nonparent, then this heightens the burden to
clear and convincing evidence.97 Some states employ a heightened burden of proof, requiring nonparents to prove their visitation is in the
child’s best interest with clear and convincing evidence.98 Other states
maintain the preponderance of the evidence standard in nonparent modification suits.99 Additionally, some states have a mixed approach, deter94. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(a); see also In re S.T., 508 S.W.3d 482, 491–93
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no pet.) (discussing factors courts consider as to whether a
parent’s acts or omissions constitute “significant impairment”).
95. In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 821–22 (Lehrmann, J., concurring).
96. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 105.005, 153.131(a); see also In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611,
616 (Tex. 2007).
97. Id. § 161.001(b).
98. SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 823 (Minn. 2007); Neely v. Welch, 2014-CA01022-COA (¶ 34), 194 So. 3d 149, 160 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015); Evans v. McTaggart, 88 P.3d
1078, 1085 (Alaska 2004); Chalmers v. Hirschkop, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 361, 371 (Cal. Ct. App.
2013); In re C.T.C., 2014 MT 306, ¶ 19, 339 P.3d 54, 58 (Mont. 2014).
99. S.M. v. R.M., 92 A.3d 1128, 1136–37 (D.C. 2014); Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1,
23 (Tenn. 2013); Schaffer v. Schaffer, 884 N.E.2d 423, 429 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
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mining that preponderance of the evidence can apply in some
modification suits, while other modification suits require a heightened
burden of clear and convincing evidence.100
The same preponderance of the evidence standard for the evidence
needed to overcome the presumption in nonparent original suits should
also apply to nonparent modification suits. In In re C.J.C., the court extended the fit parent presumption to custody modification suits because
“[s]uch a presumption is consistent with the child’s own interest in the
‘familial relationship,’ which ‘stems from the emotional attachments that
derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in
“promoting a way of life” through the instruction of children.’”101 Given
the importance the presumption plays in custody modification suits, the
same burden of proof for evidence to overcome the presumption should
carry over to extend to visitation modifications as well.
Further, a few Texas appellate courts recently discussed the burden of
proof required for modifications. In a nonparent case, the Austin court of
appeals held that “[t]he party seeking modification has the burden to establish these elements by a preponderance of the evidence” to overcome
the parental presumption.102 Thus, for consistency, Texas courts should
employ preponderance of the evidence in evaluating child modification
disputes to match the burden of proof in other statutory provisions within
the Texas Family Code.
2. The Same Standard to Overcome Parental Presumption Must Apply
to Custody and Visitation Disputes
The standing statute for conservatorship or visitation rights in the
Texas Family Code only addresses who can file a suit, not the evidence
necessary to obtain the relief sought.103 Thus, courts are left to resolve
the gap since the legislature does not specify the requirements to overcome the parental presumption. While states seem to agree that the same
test is proper to determine whether the nonparent overcomes the parental presumption in custody and visitation cases alike, disagreements arise
100. In re B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 35, 280 P.3d 78, 85 (Colo. App. 2012) (noting that “a
consensual abdication of parental rights . . . does not rise to the level of a formal and
permanent relinquishment or equate to a termination of the parent-child relationship” to
give rise to the clear and convincing evidence standard) (citing L.L. v. People, 10 P.3d
1271, 1277–78 (Colo. 2000)). But see In re B.J., 242 P.3d 1128, 1134–35 (Colo. 2010) (noting
that in order to accord due process to parents, as it does in the parental rights termination
context, the clear and convincing evidence standard is required in situations where decisions are granting a nonparent parental responsibilities over the objection of a parent who
has custody of a child) (first citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000); and then
citing In re Adoption of C.A., 137 P.3d 318, 322 (Colo. 2006)).
101. In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804, 819 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster
Fams. for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977)).
102. S.C. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-20-00179-CV, 2020 WL
4929790, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 21, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Sotelo v.
Gonzales, 170 S.W.3d 783, 788 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no pet.) (“[T]he non-parent must
prove by a preponderance of credible evidence that appointing the parent as a managing
conservator would result in serious physical or emotional harm to the child.”).
103. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 162 (Tex. 2018).
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about the use of different standards when evaluating the test.104 Courts
have found that “[t]he right of visitation derives from the right of custody
and is controlled by the same legal principles.”105 Moreover, states that
tackle this issue seem to all agree that the grant or modification of visitation rights for a nonparent “involves a lesser degree of intrusion on the
fundamental right to parent than the assignment of custody.”106 However, viewpoints differ regarding how much this difference of degree of
intrusion should change the analysis of overcoming the parental
presumption.107
To be sure, some have highlighted differences in custody and visitation
cases to argue for divergent standards. Some state courts have argued
that a nonparent seeking possessory conservatorship is not nearly as invasive of parental rights as a nonparent seeking custody, so the custody
standard should require more solidified evidence to overcome the presumption in managing conservator cases.108 Given that the nonparent, by
asking for visitation, is not trying to assert control or determine the residence of the child but instead is requesting a simpler arrangement, some
argue visitation intrudes less than custody disputes.109 For example, the
North Dakota Supreme Court held that a court “can grant decisionmaking . . . and primary residential responsibility to a [nonparent] ‘to prevent
serious harm or detriment to the child.’”110 The court qualified this statement, however, noting that finding that a child is not at risk of serious
104. David W. Lannetti, A Nonparent’s Ability to Infringe on the Fundamental Right of
Parenting: Reconciling Virginia’s Nonparental Child Custody and Visitation Standards, 30
REGENT U. L. REV. 203, 204–05 (2017).
105. Clough v. Nez, 2008 SD 125, ¶ 15, 759 N.W.2d 297, 304 (alteration in original)
(quoting Cooper v. Merkel, 470 N.W.2d 253, 255 (S.D. 1991)).
106. Koshko v. Haining, 921 A.2d 171, 186 (Md. 2007).
107. Compare id. at 192–93 (applying the same “threshold showing of either parental
unfitness or exceptional circumstances indicating that the lack of [nonparent] visitation has
a significant deleterious effect upon the children” in both custody and visitation suits), with
Fish v. Fish, 939 A.2d 1040, 1053–55, 1059–60 (Conn. 2008) (applying a higher standard in
custody suits than in visitation suits).
108. McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 22, 779 N.W.2d 652, 660; In re Marriage of
Friedman & Roels, 418 P.3d 884, 892 (Ariz. 2018) (citing Downs v. Scheffler, 80 P.3d 775,
781 n.5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003)) (recognizing that the demand for visitation in Troxel “presumably involved a less intrusive demand upon a fit parent’s constitutional right than
would a grandparent’s demand for custody”); Egan v. Fridlund-Horne, 221 P.3d 1213, 1225
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (“The legislature intended that courts treat custody and visitation
petitions in a different manner, presumably because ‘granting visitation is a far lesser intrusion, or assertion of control, than is an award of custody, and thus not nearly as invasive of
parents’ rights.’” (first quoting Graville v. Dodge, 985 P.2d 604, 610 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999);
and then citing Downs, 80 P.3d at 781 n.5)); Krieg v. Glassburn, 419 N.E.2d 1015, 1019
(Ind. Ct. App. 1981), superseded by IND. CODE § 31-1-11.7-1 to -8 (repealed); Roberts v.
Ward, 493 A.2d 478, 482 (N.H. 1985) (quoting Krieg, 419 N.E.2d at 1019); T.B. v. L.R.M.,
2000 PA Super 168, ¶ 41, 753 A.2d 873, 889 (“As the amount of time requested moves the
visit further from a visit and closer to custody, the reasons offered in support of the request
must become correspondingly more convincing.” (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Williams
v. Miller, 385 A.2d 992, 994 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978))).
109. See, e.g., Roberts, 493 A.2d at 482 (first quoting Krieg, 419 N.E.2d at 1019; and
then citing Locke, 399 A.2d at 965).
110. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 22, 779 N.W.2d at 660 (quoting In re D.P.O., 2003 ND
127, ¶ 6, 667 N.W.2d 590, 593).
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harm or detriment does not preclude the court from granting reasonable
visitation.111 To reconcile the North Dakota test of “preventing serious
harm or detriment” in visitation and custody situations, the court held:
It is not inconsistent . . . to recognize that it is not necessary to award
primary residential responsibility to [the nonparent rather than the
parent] to prevent serious harm or detriment . . . and to also recognize that it is necessary to award reasonable visitation [to a
nonparent] to prevent serious harm or detriment to [the child].112
Thus, the court found that it is not required to make the same showing of
serious harm or detriment in a visitation suit because visitation intrudes
less on the constitutional rights of the parent.113 As another state supreme court put it, “[s]ince visitation is correlative to custody a similar
test should apply when a third party seeks visitation, although the burden
on the third party should not be so heavy, for an order granting visitation
is a far lesser intrusion, or assertion of control, than is an award for custody.”114 While the test remains the same, the standard is less because the
nonparent must only convince the court in a visitation case “that it is in
the child’s best interest to give some time to the third party.”115 In custody disputes, on the other hand, nonparents must convince the court that
it is in the child’s best interest to remove custody from a parent for the
benefit of the nonparent.116
Yet other state courts disagree.117 Although Maryland courts agree
that there is a difference in the degree of intrusion between visitation and
custody, the Maryland Court of Appeals holds there is not a difference in
“constitutional magnitude,” as an intrusion on parental rights is still an
intrusion.118 The court emphasized that “[v]isitation, like custody, intrudes upon the fundamental right of parents to direct the ‘care, custody,
and control’ of their children.”119 While the visitation privileges “tread
more lightly into the protected grove of parental rights,” the court found
that such privileges “tread nonetheless,” and “[t]he sentiment . . . that
visitation matters deserve less scrutiny than custody matters is . . . incorrect.”120 Given that both nonparent visitation and custody infringe on the
same fundamental right of parental autonomy, some states conclude that
the same standard should apply to overcome the parental presumption in
visitation and custody disputes.121 Although it may seem harsh, the courts
in these states still find for parallel standards in nonparent visitation and
111. Id. ¶ 23.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Krieg, 419 N.E.2d at 1019 (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Williams v. Miller, 385
A.2d 992, 994 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)).
115. Id. (quoting Williams, 385 A.2d at 994).
116. Id. (quoting Williams, 385 A.2d at 994).
117. See, e.g., Koshko v. Haining, 921 A.2d 171, 186 (Md. 2007).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 186, 189.
121. See Lannetti, supra note 104, at 246–47.
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custody cases since “[v]isitation is ‘a limited form of custody during the
time the visitation rights are being exercised.’”122
Policy considerations also favor the application of the same standard to
both visitation and custody disputes. For example, a higher standard in
both custody and visitation disputes limits the number of disputes coming
before the court and precludes overcrowding of the court system. The
higher standard may allow courts to focus on considering issues involving
managing conservatorships instead of visitation rights. This is a benefit to
the court system, as visitation disputes are not deemed as important as
disputes over decision-making and primary residential responsibilities of
the child.123 Further, the same standard allows for an easier and more
consistent interpretation by the court for the litigant to understand the
test in both situations.124 Employing the same standard for visitation and
custody disputes improves clarity by “ensur[ing] consistent application of
standards by the courts[ ] [and] . . . provid[ing] a certain level of predictability to litigating parties.”125
Given the policy considerations and rationales offered by other state
courts such as Maryland, Texas should adopt the same custody dispute
standard for visitation disputes when determining whether the “significant impairment” test is satisfied to overcome the parental presumption.
States that have fixed on a lower standard visitation cases use a clear and
convincing standard of proof initially to evaluate overcoming the parental
presumption.126 The clear and convincing standard is a higher standard to
begin with, whereas Texas uses a preponderance of the evidence standard
for original child custody disputes and grandparent visitation, as specified
in the Texas Family Code.127 Thus, since Texas already requires a lower
burden of proof, the courts should not enable an even lower standard for
other situations of nonparent visitation. This would impede further on
parental rights and make it even easier for nonparents to overcome the
presumption and gain visitation rights.

122. Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 447 n.13 (Conn. 2002) (quoting In re Marriage of
Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. 862, 865 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)) (“We recognize that the burden of
harm that the statute imposes may be deemed unusually harsh in light of the fact that
visitation, as opposed to custody, is at issue. We draw no distinction, however, for purposes
of this discussion.”).
123. McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 22, 779 N.W.2d 652, 660.
124. Lannetti, supra note 104, at 256–57.
125. Id. at 256.
126. See SooHoo v. Johnson, 731 N.W.2d 815, 823 (Minn. 2007); Neely v. Welch, 2014CA-01022-COA (¶ 34), 194 So. 3d 149, 160 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015); Evans v. McTaggart, 88
P.3d 1078, 1089 (Alaska 2004); Chalmers v. Hirschkop, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 361, 371, 374–75
(Cal. Ct. App. 2013); In re C.T.C., 2014 MT 306, ¶ 19, 377 Mont. 106, 111, 339 P.3d 54, 58.
127. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 105.005, 153.131, 153.433(a)(2).

890

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

B. THE NEED FOR TEXAS LAW TO ESTABLISH A FACTOR TEST
DETERMINE WHETHER NONPARENT EVIDENCE OVERCOMES
THE PARENTAL PRESUMPTION

TO

1. Through Texas Congressional Legislation
In at least five states, courts refused to create a test to overcome the
parental presumption in recognition of certain nonparent custody and visitation rights, opting instead to wait for legislative guidance.128 One state
court, whose ruling has since been overruled by statute, avoided awarding
visitation to a nonparent, reasoning that:
By deferring to the Legislature in matters involving complex social
and policy ramifications far beyond the facts of the particular case,
we are not telling the parties that the issues they raise are unworthy
of legal recognition. . . . [W]e intend only to illustrate the limitations
of the courts in fashioning a comprehensive solution to such a complex and socially significant issue.129
The decisions of these state courts, although superseded by state statutory
provisions granting visitation,130 reflected the belief that the legislature—
not the court—is better equipped to “gather broad public input and distill
public preferences for handling the hard choices and complex issues involved” in determining how to solve nonparent visitation disputes.131
While state legislatures specify the factors for courts to consider in rebutting the parental presumption in visitation disputes, there are minor
differences between the factor tests created by each state. However, each
state legislature provides the factor test as guidance for courts to make
the proper determination of the best interest of the child. The factors that
several state legislatures deem as most important for its state courts to
consider are provided below.
The Illinois legislature created relevant factors for state courts to use in
determining custody or visitation issues.132 In determining whether to
grant visitation, Illinois courts are expressly directed to consider: (1) the
wishes of the child; (2) the mental and physical health of the child; (3) the
128. O’Dell v. O’Dell, 629 So. 2d 891, 891–92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Petition of
Ash, 507 N.W.2d 400, 402–03 (Iowa 1993); In re Hood, 847 P.2d 1300, 1303 (Kan. 1993)
(“The legislature must decide if and when intrusion into the protected family unit, in the
form of third party visitation, is justified by a legitimate state interest.”); In re J.M., 750
A.2d 442, 444 (Vt. 2000); Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 214–16, 219 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991).
129. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
130. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.011 (West 2015); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600C.1 (West 2011);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-3301 (West 2012), partially invalidated by T.N.Y. ex rel. Z.H. v.
E.Y., 360 P.3d 433, 439–42 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015) (striking “In an action under article 27 of
chapter 23 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, and amendments thereto” from the statute
because “limiting grandparent visitation to dissolution of marriage proceedings . . . violates
the equal protection rights of children whose parents never married”); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-3302 (West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1012 (West 2021); CAL. FAM. CODE
§§ 3040–3041, 3100–3105 (West 2020).
131. McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 35, 779 N.W.2d 652, 666 (Crothers, J.,
concurring).
132. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602.9(b)(5), 46/802(a) (West 2019).
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mental and physical health of the nonparent; (4) the length and quality of
the prior relationship between the child and nonparent; (5) the good faith
of the party filing the petition; (6) the good faith of the person denying
visitation; (7) the quantity of visitation time requested and potential adverse impact of that visitation on the child’s customary activities; (8) any
other fact that is likely to unduly harm the child’s mental, physical, or
emotional health; and (9) whether visitation is structured in a way to minimize the child’s exposure to conflicts between the parent and
nonparent.133
The Ohio legislature lays out certain factors for courts to consider in
determining whether to grant companionship or visitation rights to a
grandparent, relative, or other specific nonparent.134 Some of the factors
included in the statute are: (1) the location and distance between the
homes of the nonparent and the child’s home; (2) whether either person
lives out of state; (3) the availability of the child and nonparent depending on each parent’s work schedule, the child’s school schedule, and the
parent’s and child’s holiday and vacation schedule; (4) the child’s age; (5)
the child’s adjustment to home, school, and the community; (6) the child’s
wishes, if the court interviewed the child in chambers; (7) the child’s
health and safety; (8) how much time the child can spend with siblings;
(9) the physical and mental health of all parties; (10) whether the
nonparent was previously convicted of or plead guilty to criminal offense
involving a child; and (11) any other factors in the best interest of the
child.135 Ohio courts have determined that they must give deference to
the parental presumption first.136 Then, a court can weigh the child’s best
interest regarding nonparent visitation through the statutory factors
against the parent’s wishes under the presumption.137 The court must give
the wishes and concerns of the parent special weight through the parental
presumption before evaluating whether or not the best interests of the
child outweigh that presumption, as mandated in Troxel.138
In Nevada, to rebut the parental presumption, the nonparent must
show that visitation by the nonparent is in the child’s best interest.139 To
determine whether the nonparent has rebutted such a presumption, the
trial court must consider the factors in the Nevada statute, section
133. Id. 5/602.9(b)(5).
134. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.051(D) (West 2021), partially invalidated by Frazier
v. Frazier, No. 02CA8, 2003 WL 931296, 2003-Ohio-1087, ¶ 27 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 11,
2003) (“[A]lthough the ‘language of the statute’ does not elevate any one of the factors
above the others, Troxel makes it clear that factor 15 of R.C. 3109.051(D), the wishes and
concerns of the parent, are to be accorded ‘special weight.’” (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 69–70 (2000))).
135. Id.
136. Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St. 3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 1165, ¶¶ 42–44;
Frazier, 2003-Ohio-1087, ¶¶ 23, 27.
137. Harrold, 2005-Ohio-5334, ¶¶ 43–44; Frazier, 2003-Ohio-1087, ¶¶ 23, 27.
138. Harrold, 2005-Ohio-5334, ¶¶ 42–44.
139. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125C.050(4) (West 2001).
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125C.050(6), for governing child disputes.140 The factors listed in section
125C.050(6) for the court’s consideration include: (1) the love, affection,
and other emotional ties existing between the child and nonparent; (2)
the capacity and disposition of the nonparent to give the child love and
affection, provide the child with food and clothing during visits, and provide the child with health care or alternative care; (3) the prior relationship between child and nonparent; (4) the moral fitness of the nonparent;
(5) the mental and physical health of the nonparent; (6) the reasonable
preference of the child; (7) the willingness and ability of the nonparent to
facilitate and encourage a close relationship between the child and parent
or parents; (8) the medical and other needs of the child as affected by the
visitation; (9) the support provided by the nonparent; and (10) any other
factor in the situation that proves relevant to granting a right to visitation.141 Additionally, the court “must consider that ‘custodial stability
is . . . of significant concern’ when [determining] a child’s best interest.”142
Utah provides seven requirements necessary to rebut the parental presumption before custodial or visitation rights to a person other than a
parent are granted.143 The first six factors require an examination into the
nature and quality of the relationship between the child and the
nonparent, including whether: (1) the nonparent intentionally assumed
the role and obligations of a parent; (2) the nonparent and child have
formed an emotional bond and created a parent–child type relationship;
(3) the nonparent contributed emotionally or financially to child’s wellbeing; (4) the assumption of the parental role is not the result of a financially compensated surrogate care arrangement; (5) the continuation of
the relationship between the person and the child is in the child’s best
interests; and (6) the loss or cessation of the relationship between the
person and the child is detrimental to the child.144 The seventh factor
concerns “the status of the child’s current legal parent.”145 To satisfy this
factor, the petitioner must demonstrate that the legal parent either: (a) is
absent, or (b) is found by the court to have abused or neglected the
child.146 Once the petitioner demonstrates all seven factors, then the
court may award the petitioner custodial visitation rights.147
Virginia courts use a “harmful or detrimental to the welfare of the
child” test to determine whether to grant visitation to a nonparent in contravention of a fit parent’s objection.148 The court in Stadter v. Siperko
140. Kahl v. Williams, No. 75049-COA, 2019 WL 912630, at *1 (Nev. Ct. App. Feb. 20,
2019).
141. § 125C.050(6).
142. Rennels v. Rennels, 257 P.3d 396, 403 (Nev. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting
Ellis v. Carucci, 161 P.3d 239, 243 (Nev. 2007)).
143. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5a-103(2) (West 2021).
144. Id. § 30-5a-103(2)(a)–(f).
145. O’Hearon v. Hansen, 2017 UT App 214, ¶ 13, 409 P.3d 85, 90 (citing D.A. v. D.H.,
2014 UT App 138, ¶ 14, 329 P.3d 828).
146. § 30-5a-103(2)(g).
147. O’Hearon, 2017 UT App 214, ¶ 13, 409 P.3d at 90.
148. Stadter v. Siperko, 661 S.E.2d 494, 498 (Va. Ct. App. 2008) (first quoting Williams
v. Williams, 485 S.E.2d 651, 654 (Va. Ct. App. 1997); and then citing Denise v. Tencer, 617
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held that to rebut the presumption in favor of the parent, evidence
through the statutory best-interest factors149 “must establish more than
the obvious observation that the child would benefit from the continuing . . . attachment with the non-parent.”150 In Virginia, the courts consider the same best-interest-of-the-child factors for determining both
custody and visitation disputes.151 The best-interest factors within the
statutory provision in Virginia include: (1) the age and physical and
mental condition of the child; (2) the age and physical and mental condition of each parent; (3) the relationship existing between each parent and
each child; (4) the needs of the child, including other important relationships such as siblings, peers, and extended family members; (5) the role
each parent has played and will play in the future; (6) the propensity of
each parent to actively support the child’s contact and relationship with
the other parent; (7) the relative willingness and ability of each parent to
maintain a close relationship with the child; (8) the reasonable preference
of the child; (9) history of family abuse, sexual abuse, child abuse, or acts
of violence; and (10) other factors the court deems necessary and proper
on case-by-case basis.152 The court in Virginia determined that a
nonparent with a “legitimate interest” is granted visitation rights “upon a
showing by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of the
child would be served [by visitation].”153 The court stated the nonparent
must present evidence “sufficient to overcome the constitutional concerns in the . . . Troxel presumption” through the state statutory bestinterest analysis.154 This signals that the same best-interest factors are
used to evaluate visitation disputes as between a parent and nonparent
and as between two parents.155
2. Through Court Intervention Without Legislative Action
a. Texas Court Analysis After In re C.J.C. Regarding Visitation and
Overcoming The Parental Presumption
Although an appeals court in Texas has evaluated a nonparent’s visitation dispute since the decision of In re C.J.C., the court found no evidence
to overcome the parental presumption and failed to provide much guidance on the factors considered.156 The court found that the children
would be impaired if the children had no access to the nonparent; however, because no evidence indicated that the father planned to put a stop
S.E.2d 413, 420 (Va. Ct. App. 2005)); see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-124.2(B), 20-124.3
(West 2020).
149. See § 20-124.3.
150. Stadter, 661 S.E.2d at 500.
151. See § 20-124.3.
152. Id.
153. Stadter, 661 S.E.2d at 498 (alteration in original) (citing § 20-124.2(B)).
154. Id. (first citing Williams v. Williams, 485 S.E.2d 651, 654 (Va. Ct. App. 1997); and
then citing Denise v. Tencer, 617 S.E.2d 413, 420 (Va. Ct. App. 2005)).
155. See id.
156. See In re S.K., No. 13-19-00213-CV, 2020 WL 4812633, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi–Edinburg Aug. 13, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
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to the relationship between the child and the nonparent, “there was no
evidence that [the parent’s] decisions would impair the children’s emotional well-being.”157 The only consideration expressed by the court was
whether the parent intended to prevent a continuing, meaningful relationship between the children and the nonparent.158 Thus, the court failed
to acknowledge any of the other factors the Texas Supreme Court mandated for consideration in all child disputes in Holley. Given the ruling in
In re C.J.C., a factor test would significantly help guide Texas courts when
considering evidence to overcome the parental presumption in all child
disputes, specifically visitation suits.
b. Other State Courts’ Analyses to Rebut Parental Presumption in
Visitation
The Texas Constitution requires the separation of powers of the state
government’s three branches, prohibiting any of the three branches from
exercising any power attributed to another.159 The legislature is expressly
directed to make law and the judiciary to interpret and apply the law.160
A “department may constitutionally exercise any power whatever its essential nature, which has, by the constitution, been delegated to it.”161 As
commentators note, “the practical necessities of efficient government
have prevented [the prohibited blending of the powers in the Texas Constitution’s] complete application.”162 The Texas judiciary’s role is to apply
the law, and in order to apply the “significant impairment” test, the creation of a factor test falls within the court’s jurisdiction. This factor analysis
will allow lower courts to establish what and how much evidence is
needed to satisfy the rebuttal of the parental presumption, which was created by the legislature.
Most state legislatures have rapidly expanded nonparent rights in the
last fifty years, enacting statutory provisions that grant nonparents child
visitation rights in certain situations.163 However, some state courts decided to opt in to a case-by-case evaluation to help parties resolve visitation issues when there is a lack of state legislative action.164 Justice
Lehrmann’s concurrence in In re C.J.C. implied that the Texas Supreme
Court would consider creating a factor test to determine the evidence
sufficient to overcome the parental presumption for visitation.165 By stating that the nonparent failed to make a claim to give the court the “op157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1.
TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1 interp. commentary (West 2007).
Id.
Joslin v. State, 722 S.W.2d 725, 733 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986) (quoting TEX.
CONST. art. II, § 1 interp. commentary (Vernon 1984)), vacated, 761 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1988).
163. See Lannetti, supra note 104, at 208.
164. See, e.g., McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶¶ 31–37, 779 N.W.2d 652, 662–66
(Crothers, J., concurring).
165. See In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804, 822–23 (Tex. 2020) (Lehrmann, J., concurring).
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portunity to do so” in the case at hand, this suggests the Texas Supreme
Court, if given the right opportunity, will not wait for the legislature to
get involved.166
Cases from other state supreme courts “demonstrate that . . . courts
may afford the requisite deference to a fit parent’s decisions concerning
[the] child while still giving due consideration to the effect on the child’s
well-being of severing, or significantly curtailing, contact with a
[nonparent].”167 Terminating contact between a nonparent viewed as a
parent and a child might create a “dramatic, and even traumatic, effect
upon the child’s well-being,” which the court should consider in its decision regarding the child’s visitation.168 As one court pointed out, “studies
[have] confirm[ed] that the loss of—or sudden, long-term separation
from—an attachment figure [like a nonparent in a parent-like role] creates significant psychological harm in children and can ‘seriously injure
and fragment an individual’s sense of self.’”169 Thus, nonparent presence
proves essential in certain situations for the child to avoid suffering significant physical or emotional impairments.
One Pennsylvania court found that the distinguishing factors between
visitation and custody include: (1) “the length, frequency, and place of
visits”; (2) “who has effective control of the child during the visits”; and
(3) whether the custodial parent has the option of accompanying the child
on the visits.170 The court considers these factors in addition to the bestinterest factors in all child cases for Pennsylvania.171
In North Dakota, the supreme court determined that awarding custody
to a nonparent is only granted in “exceptional circumstances” that will
further the best interest of the child.172 The court agreed to extend the
same test to award visitation to a nonparent.173 The factors the court considered in the North Dakota case of McAllister v. McAllister included: (1)
the length of time the nonparent was involved in the child’s life; (2) the
child’s reference to nonparent as a parent through verbally calling him
“dad”; (3) that the continuation of visitation with nonparent also fostered
a bond with step-siblings; and (4) the custody investigator’s testimony regarding the best interest of the child, her lack of concern over the
nonparent’s ability to maintain a strong bond with the child, and the importance for the child to maintain regular contact with the nonparent because the child considered him family.174
166. See id. at 822–23.
167. Id. at 823 (citing Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, ¶¶ 23–26, 761 A.2d 291, 301).
168. Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 26, 761 A.2d at 301.
169. In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 823 n.4 (Lehrmann, J., concurring) (quoting Rebecca L.
Scharf, Psychological Parentage, Troxel, and the Best Interests of the Child, 13 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 615, 634 (2012)).
170. Bucci v. Bucci, 506 A.2d 438, 443 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
171. See id. at 439.
172. McAllister v. McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 21, 779 N.W.2d 652, 660 (quoting Quirk v.
Swanson, 368 N.W.2d 557, 560 (N.D. 1985)).
173. Id.
174. See id. ¶¶ 4, 6, 8, 779 N.W.2d at 655–56.
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New York courts acknowledge that even when the presumption is
strong that a fit parent’s decisions are in the best interest of the child, the
court can determine otherwise.175 In E.S. v. P.D., the court considered:
(1) the law guardian’s assessment; (2) the nonparent’s extraordinarily
close relationship with the child while living with the nonparent; (3) the
nonparent’s appreciation and respect for the separate roles the nonparent
and parent play in the child’s life; (4) the child’s wishes for whether the
relationship with the nonparent continued; and (5) the nonparent’s dedication and willingness to improve the relationship between the nonparent
and parent for the sake of the child.176 Thus, the court granted regular
visitation to the nonparent.177
Lastly, South Dakota courts hold that “[i]n order to grant a nonparent
visitation rights with a minor child over the objections of a parent, a clear
showing of gross misconduct, unfitness, or other extraordinary circumstances affecting the welfare of the child is required.”178 South Dakota
statutes provide examples of “extraordinary circumstances” that might
defeat a visitation claim.179 In Clough v. Nez, the court emphasized that
the extraordinary circumstances supporting nonparent visitation rights
with a child “denote[ ] more than a simple showing that visitation would
be in the child’s best interest.”180 In determining that the situation constituted an extraordinary circumstance, the court considered factors, such
as: (1) the child referring to the nonparent as “dad”; (2) the strength of
the relationship between the child and nonparent; and (3) the testimony
of witnesses, including the nonparent and the parent admitting that forbidding visitation of the nonparent would put the child through mental
stress.181
If the Texas Legislature remains silent on this issue, the Texas Supreme
Court should step in and create a factor test to determine whether evidence overcomes the parental presumption in visitation cases to avoid
inconsistencies in lower courts. Determining how to analyze evidence in
compliance with the state legislature’s “significant impairment” test will
also avoid the hesitation of lower courts in addressing the gap. Since
nonparent visitation rights still result in a degree of intrusion on parental
rights, Texas can address this issue to prevent further disruption into the
lives of more children and their parents through a flexible factor test that
is amendable to varying fact patterns.

175. E.S. v. P.D., 863 N.E.2d 100, 106 (N.Y. 2007).
176. Id. at 104.
177. Id. at 101.
178. Clough v. Nez, 2008 SD 125, ¶ 9, 759 N.W.2d 297, 302 (alteration in original)
(quoting D.G. v. D.M.K., 1996 SD 144, ¶ 46, 557 N.W.2d. 235, 243))
179. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-29, 25-5-30 (2021).
180. Clough, ¶ 10, 759 N.W.2d at 302.
181. Id. ¶¶ 17–18, 759 N.W.2d at 305.
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3. The Visitation Factors Necessary in Considering the Best Interest of
the Child
The factors currently considered by some state supreme courts are similar to the factors also enacted in the statutory language of other states.
Thus, a combination of factors by which other state courts and legislatures abide should influence the Texas factor test of whether the
nonparent has presented sufficient evidence to overcome the parental
presumption in visitation cases.
Overall, the main factors considered in nonparent visitation rights by
the other state legislatures that the Texas legislature should implement
are: (1) the length and quality of the prior relationship between the child
and nonparent seeking visitation rights;182 (2) the specific details of the
nonparent’s visitation request, such as the quantity of time and the distance in between the nonparent and child’s homes;183 as well as (3) the
effect that the nonparent’s visitation will have in developing other important relationships in the child’s life.184 These specific factors, in addition
to the Holley factors considered in the best-interest analysis for every
case involving a child, would increase the predictability of visitation decisions in Texas for litigants and prevent confusion by providing guidance
for court analysis.
First, the length and quality of the prior relationship between child and
nonparent is an important factor in the consideration of nonparent visitation suits. This factor gives further context to whether the child is “significantly impaired” by denying visitation with the nonparent. Although it
may be difficult to draw a dividing line between whether this factor goes
in favor or against the nonparent, the specific circumstances in each case
can provide context for the direction this factor goes in. Further, the nature, frequency, and duration of contact between the child and nonparent
prior to the visitation dispute may significantly impact the child negatively once that contact with the nonparent ceases to exist. For example, if
the nonparent, prior to the visitation dispute, spent time with the child for
ten years every day for multiple hours, the bond between the child and
nonparent can be strong enough that separation of the relationship may
significantly impair the child.
Additionally, the quantity of time requested and distance between the
nonparent and child’s homes is also a factor courts should consider in the
child’s best-interest analysis for visitation cases. If the nonparent and the
parent disagree over the frequency and duration of the visitation-related
mandate, this conflict between the nonparent and parent may impair both
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(1) (West 2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5a-103(2)(b)
(West 2021); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125C.050(6)(c) (West 2021); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/602.9(b)(5)(D) (West 2019).
183. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602.9(b)(5)(G) (West 2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3109.051(D)(2), (10) (West 2014).
184. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.051(D)(1), (8) (West 2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 20124.3(4) (West 2021);
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the nonparent and parent’s relationship with the child.185 The tension
may also cause the child to feel uneasy or uncomfortable around both
parties. When a nonparent requests more visitation time, there is more
intrusion on parental rights to make decisions and to assert control over
the child, as the parent loses time with the child.186 Further, before determining whether to grant nonparent visitation rights, another consideration is the distance between the nonparent and child’s primary residence.
The court will likely find that traveling too long and far is burdensome on
the child and may negatively affect the child through significant expenses,
exhaustion, and isolation from friends and family.187 Difficult travel that
may occur in locations with heavy snowfall and harsh winters can weigh
against visitation.188 However, if visitation is in the best interest of the
child, the court can consider whether the nonparent can find a temporary
residence close to the child’s residence during periods of visitation,189 or
whether structuring the visitation time in blocks to accommodate farther
distances between the parent and nonparent’s homes is possible.190
Lastly, the legislature should consider whether the nonparent’s visitation will improve or further other relationships for the child, by either: (1)
the nonparent providing a good faith effort in facilitating a close relationship between the child and parent and conducting visitation in a way to
minimize the child’s exposure to conflict between the nonparent and the
parent;191 or (2) the availability to spend time around siblings, peers, and
extended family members during the nonparent’s visitation period.192
Courts hold “that it is ordinarily in the best interest of a child to be raised
with his or her siblings.”193 Thus, “it follows that remaining together [with
siblings] in visitation will probably also serve [the child’s best interests],
especially where the children are so close in age.”194 The nonparent’s effort to support the child’s relationships with siblings or other extended
family members fosters strong familial bonds with relatives that the child
may not have had the opportunity to maintain otherwise. A court found
that this involvement with the child promotes the child’s best interest.195
185. Romesberg, supra note 4, at 168–69.
186. See T.B. v. L.R.M., 2000 PA Super 168, ¶ 41, 753 A.2d 873, 889; McAllister v.
McAllister, 2010 ND 40, ¶ 22, 779 N.W.2d at 660.
187. See, e.g., In re F.D., No. 23358, 2009 WL 2915618, at *6, 2009-Ohio-4788, ¶ 37
(Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2009).
188. Id.
189. See In re Marriage of Friedman & Roels, 418 P.3d 884, 894 (Ariz. 2018).
190. Merritt v. Gray, No. 2003-03-4, 2004 WL 1959352, at *4–5 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 7,
2004).
191. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125C.050(6)(g) (West 2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3109.051(D)(13) (West 2014); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602.9(b)(5)(I) (West 2019).
192. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(4) (West 2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3109.051(D)(1), (8) (West 2014).
193. Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 93 (Md. 2008); see also Hughes v. Gentry,
443 S.E.2d 448, 451–52 (Va. Ct. App. 1994) (“[T]he effect of the separation of siblings must
be and should be considered . . . .” (first citing Hepler v. Hepler, 79 S.E.2d 652, 659 (Va.
1954); and then citing Smith v. Pond, 360 S.E.2d 885, 887–88 (Va. Ct. App. 1987)).
194. Quinn v. Mouw-Quinn, 1996 SD 103, ¶ 15, 552 N.W.2d 843, 847.
195. Id. ¶¶ 16–17.
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The U.S. Supreme Court, since Meyer and Pierce,196 has held that “the
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”197 Providing the opportunity for a child to keep close ties with the
child’s family may instill culture, morals, and other customs that the family deems important to pass down through generations.
4. A Factor Test Creates Clarity and Predictability in Clouded Area of
Law
Implementing the factor test in family law cases, specifically child disputes, furthers significant policy rationales. Factors provide flexibility for
the court to use its discretion in emphasizing specific factors and applying
the test on a case-by-case basis to ensure that a just and proper result
takes place. Additionally, factors lay out certain objectives to consider,
which can avoid extreme inconsistencies among lower courts use standards and eliminate a significant degree of unfairness. This makes parties
in litigation aware of the factors the court considers so that they can prepare for the court’s analysis and understand the possible outcomes before
expenses are incurred.198
At the same time, factor tests may give judges more room to insert
their personal opinions with the ability to emphasize certain factors and
de-emphasize others when determining the best interests of a child. However, judges may make better decisions than a jury in tricky situations,
given their familiarity with the contours of family law. Moreover, a
judge’s job is to apply the law—not to create it.199 Thus, judges should
avoid inserting their discretion and simply apply the facts of the case to
the legislature’s direction.
Additionally, the factor test in the best-interest analysis may consist of
a list that is considered extremely difficult to overcome in order to protect the fundamental rights of parental autonomy. For example, another
state court held that allowing nonparents to overcome the parental presumption with little evidence “would promote family discord and would
discourage parents from seeking assistance from grandparents [and other
nonparents] to ensure that the children have adequate care during times
of difficulty.”200 This situation scares parents into thinking that courts
may grant nonparents visitation rights of their children when help is necessary during times of need.201 While it is imperative to “adequately safeguard the fundamental . . . nature of the parental liberty interest” instilled
in our Constitution, it is also important to balance the best interest of the
196. See generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
197. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
198. See Lannetti, supra note 104, at 256.
199. TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1 interp. commentary (West 2007).
200. Hembree v. Hembree, 660 So. 2d 1342, 1345 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995).
201. See id.
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child when determining visitation rights.202 The additional factors proposed will strengthen the best-interest analysis in child visitation disputes.
V. CONCLUSION
Texas jurisprudence, or lack thereof, in the area of nonparental visitation leaves courts and parties in litigation uncertain about the standard
required and unsure about the evidence sufficient in light of the parental
presumption. This Comment urges the state legislature or the Texas Supreme Court to create a factor test that leaves the court flexibility in applying the factors on a case-by-case basis but also gives guidance to lower
courts on the proper evaluation of the factors. This factor test for visitation suits balances various considerations necessary to make a fair decision regarding a child’s best interest in light of the parental presumption.
State legislatures and courts in other areas of the country clarify the
proper standard to apply when evaluating evidence to overcome the parental presumption, while also using a factor test in analyzing whether the
standard is met. This factor test may provide litigants an opportunity to
predict outcomes and may reduce the proportion of meritless claims, allowing the court system to spend its resources determining the “close
call” cases. Instead of continuing to apply inconsistencies at the lower
court level, Texas should create a test to make an already clouded area of
family law clearer, like other states have recognized and done in the past
decade.

202. See Hunter v. Hunter, 771 N.W.2d 694, 703 (Mich. 2009).

